ეფრემ II: მსოფლიო რეაქციული ძალები ყოველმხრივ ცდილობენ დასცენ ქვეყანა ცეცხლოვან გიენას შინა

როგორც თქვენთვის ცნობილია მოქალაქე რადიომსმენელებო, ამ ბოლო დროს ამერიკის შეერთებულმა შტატებმა განახორციელეს ატომური აფეთქებები მაღალ ატმოსფეროში და განზრახული აქვთ თერმოატომგულის ბომბის აფეთქება კოსმოსში. მან მსოფლიოს სხვადასხვა ეროვნების და სარწმუნოების ხალხთა სამართლიანი აღშფოთება გამოიწვია.

ეფრემ II იმჟამად მიტროპოლიტ ილიასთან ერთად, 1971 წ.

გთხოვთ მომისმინოთ:

ერთხელ კიდევ მიხდება მე, უძველესი ქართული მართლამდიდებლური ქრიატიანული ეკლესიის სახელით გულის ტკივილით მივმართო ჩემს თანამოძმეთა და თანამემამულეთ და თქვენი შუალობით კაცობიობის იმ ნაწილს, რომელსაც შეგნებული აქვს ის საშინელებანი, რასაც გვიქადის ჩვენ თავშეუკავებელი შეიარაღება ადამიანთა მოდგმის მასობრივი გაჟლეტის იარაღით.

დიდი ხანი არაა, რაც პრაღაში შეკრებილ მთელი მსოფლიოს ქრისტიან წარმომადგენელთა ყრილობაზე, მე სრულის შეგენით ჩემი მწყემსმთავრული მოვალეობისა, მივმართე ასეთივე სიტყვით დამსწრეთ და მათი საშუალებით უფრო შორს, უძველეს ქართული მართლმადიდებელი ეკლესიის სახელით, გაფრთხილებით და ვედრებით იმ საშინელებათაგან საფარის საძიებლად, რასაც უმზადებენ ჩვენს მიწიერ ცხოვრებას ბოროტი ზრახვებით შეპყრობილი ომის მომზადებისა და გაჩაღების სატანისმიერი ბნელი ძალები.

ჩვენ კვლავ და კვლავ გვიხდება ასეთი გამოსვლები კაცობრიობის პროგრესული ნაწილის მხარდასაჭერად ბოროტი ძალების ასალაგმავად, რათა ამით განვამტკიცოთ შეგნება იმ გზის დამღუპველობისა, რომლისკენაც უბიძგებენ კაცობრიობას მტერი კოლონიალისტები – დასავლეთ ქვეყნების აგრესიული ძალები.

როგორც სავსებით ნათელია საბჭოთა ქვეყნის მეთაურის – მშვიდობისათვის მებრძოლ – ნიკიტა სერგის ძე ხრუშჩოვის განცხადებიდან, ამერიკის მიერ ატმოსფეროს სიმაღლეში ატომური აფეთქების გეგმასთან დაკავშირებით ომის მუქარა სულ უფრო და უფრო საშიში და სახიფათო ხდება და ყოველ დღე შეიძლება გადაიზარდოს ომის უშუალო სინამდვილედ.

იქვე მითითებული განცხადება ამერიკის პრეზიდენტისა, რომ მას მოუხდება საომარ მოქმედებათა დაწყების სანიშნო ღილაკზე თითის დაჭერა, მთელის ცინიზმით გამოხატავს იმ გაბოროტებას, რომლითაც აღსავსეა ომის გამჩაღებელთა ბანაკი; ნათელი ხდება რომ მსოფლიო რეაქციული ძალები ყოველმხრივ ცდილობენ დასცენ ქვეყანა ცეცხლოვან გიენას შინა, გასახარებლად ბოროტებისა და გასანადგურებლად ყოველი კულტურული, ეკონომიკური და სხვა ღირებულებათა.

იყო დრო, როცა ძალადობა და ომი ბუნებრივ ამბავად ითვლებოდა ადამინთა შორის უკმაყოფილების მოსაგვარებლად, მაგრამ ეს იყო ხანა, დაბალი კულტურის, ფეხმოუდგმელი ცივილიზაციისა, როცა ადამიანები არც ისე შორს იყვნენ ცხოველთა ვნებათაგან და მხეცური გამომეტყველებისაგან მსჯელობასა და მოქმედებაში. ყველა ამის გაგება შეიძლებოდა იმ დროისათვის, მაგრამ გამართლება კი არა. ამასთან ერთად, საზოგადოების განვითარების იმ პირობებში შეიარაღება მარტივი იყო, ხოლო ომის საშინელაბანიც ისეთი არ იყო, როგორიც არის ის დღესა და შეიძლება იყოს ხვალ.

მეცნიერებისა და ტექნიკის განვითარებამ ნივთიერ დიდ შედეგების მიღწევასთან ერთად ვერ შესძლო კლასობრივ საზოგადოებაში თანაბარი შედეგების მიღწევა ადამიანის სულიერი წარმატებისა და განკულტუროსნების დარგში.

ხომ ვერ დავუშვებთ ერთი წუთითაც, რომ კაცობრიობამ იმისათვის შექმნა დიდი მატერიალური ღირებულებანი, მანქანები, ააგო სასახლეები კულტურისა და წინსვლისა – კაცობრიობის გენიალობის ძეგლები და დასასრულ ისე გაკოტრდა სულიერად, რომ დაივიწყა შთაგონება და პათოსი თავისი შემოქმედებისა და იმავე მანქანას მიანდო განადგურება, როგორც კულტურულ მიღწევათა, ისე თვით ადამიანისაც?!

ნუ თუ საუკუნეთა განმავლობაში იმისათვის იღწვოდა კაცობრიობა, რათა შეექმნა უმაღლესი ღირებულებანი და თვალის ჩინივით უვლიდა მას, ნუ თუ იმისათვის ოცნებობნდა კაცობრიობა უკეთესი მომავლისთვის, თავისი შვილებისა და შთამომავლობისა, რომ ერთ დღეს გონებადაბნელებულს მტვრად ექცია ეს ყველაფერი და რაკეტული ომის ცეცხლისათვის მიეცა ჩასანთქავად და აღსაგველად სიცოცხლისა პირიდან ჩვენი პლანეტისა.

არა, ეს ყველაფერი დაუშვებელია, და ჩვენ უნდა განვაცხადოთ: უკმარი ჩანს ქრისტიანული მოკრძალებული ქადაგება მშვიდობისა და სიყვარულისა და ძმათა შორის სათნოებისა. დაჰკრა ჟამმა, როცა საჭირო შეიქმნა გადამწყვეტი ნაბიჯების გადადგმა, საჭიროა მთელი ცივილიზებული კაცობრიობის ძალთა გაერთიანება, რათა კაცობრიობის მტრებმა ვერ შესძლონ მოწინავე ერების საფრთხეში ჩაგდება და თავისი ბნელი ზრახვების განხორციელება. საჭიროა პროგრესული კაცობრიობის ერთობა, რათა ომი შეუძლებელი გახდეს, რათა ომი იქნეს დაძლეული.

მშვიდობის გამარჯვება მხოლოდ ბრძოლით მოიპოვება, ამიტომ – ბრძოლა,  ომი – მშვიდობის გამარჯვებისათვის! ნიკიტა სერგის ძემ დაახასიათა ამერიკელთა ნაბიჯი მაღალ ატმოსფეროში რაკეტულ აფეთქებათა შესახებ, როგორც აგრესია. ამის საწინააღმდეგო ბრძოლაა საჭირო, ბრძოლა შეურიგებელი და გადაუდებელი.

საჭიროა გვახსოვდეს, რომ შეიარაღება თავდაპირველად ომის გზაა, ომისათვის მზადებაა. ამიტომ ჩვენმა დრომ და ჩვენმა საბჭოთა ქვეყანამ ლოზუნგი წამოაყენა: ვისაც სურს მშვიდობა და კაცობრიობის განთავისუფლება თვითმკვლელობისაგან, იგი უნდა ებრძოდეს გამალებულ შეიარაღებას. საერთო განიარაღება -ასეთია ომის შეუძლებლობის გზა და სადაო საკითხების მშვიდობისა და მოლაპარაკებით გადაწყვეტის გზა.

უძველესი ქართული მართლმადიდებლი ეკლესია, კაცთა შორის მშვიდობისა და სიყვარულისათვის მლოცველი, უერთებს თვის ხმას განიარაღებისათვის ბრძოლის გაძლიერებას, როგორც ერთად ერთ საწინდარს კაცობრიობის გადარჩენისა საერთო განადგურებისაგან და მის მიღწევათა და მონაპოვარის მომავალ თაობათა საბედნიეროდ შენარჩუნებას.

ეფრემ II

1962 წლის 12 ივნისი

სცსა

1880 არქივი 76 აღწერა 1

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SOVIET PATRIARCH TOASTS US AMITY

By HARRISON E. SALISBURY Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

New York Times (1923-Current file); May 20, 1951; p g. 20

Georgian Church Head Talks to Correspondent and Urges Efforts Toward Peace.

TIFLIS, Georgia, Soviet Union, May 18 – Eighty-five-year-old Patriarch Kallistrat Tzintsadze of the Georgian Orthodox Church, whose flowing white hair and beard, and twinkling blue eyes make him look like an child’s vision of St. Nicholas, is an alert and active man despite his years.
He lives in a pleasant second-story apartment on the grounds of Zion cathedral, which, since the seventeenth century, has been the principal Georgian Orthodox Church, and which houses the church’s most sacred relic – the cross of St. Nina, who introduced Christianity to Georgia in the fourth century.
After discussing the state of ecclesiastical affairs in Georgia, the Patriarch invited this correspondent to join him in a little food and drink. Despite the fact that he celebrated his eighty-fifth birthday April 24, the Patriarch poured out glasses of fine Georgian brandy with steady hand and drank a toast to the friendship of the United States and Georgia with frank relish. This toast was followed by many others, drunk in rich Georgian wine from the district of Tsinandali.
100 churches in Georgia
The Patriarch is well satisfied with the present state of the Georgian Orthodox Church. He said relations with the government were good and the congregations had remained at an excellent level achieved in wartime. There are more than 100 Orthodox churches now operating in Georgia, and eleven in Tiflis alone.
He is preparing an report to the government on the need for reestablishing an seminary for the training of Georgian Orthodox priests. He pointed out that the Russian Orthodox Church had a large seminary in Zagorsk, and his report will stress the need for training priests in Georgian service.
The Patriarch lives and works in an office whose walls are covered almost completely with icons and church emblems. His bare white-painted iron bed is in the same room. On one shelf are seven little elephants carved of Ural stone, the traditional Russian symbol of good luck. A white and gray kitten sunned itself in the window.
The table heaped by the patriarch was typical of Georgian hospitality, which he frankly described as the best in the world.
Offers Variety of Food
On the table were heaping mounds of spring strawberries as big as apricots, dishes of candied plumbs, preserved grapes, preserved melon rind, candies and cakes.
But the thing of which the Patriarch perhaps was most proud was his new car – a zim.
“The other day I got a present” the Patriarch said. “ It was a new Zim. It is the first Zim in Tiflis.”
The thing that interests the Patriarch most these days is peace. His one request was that this correspondent report objectively his wish that there be no war between Russia and the United States.
“Educated people everywhere must do everything possible for peace” he said. “ the atom bomb would kill millions and smash the world. My message to America is this : I will do everything possible for peace. I pray to God for peace. I ask only that America do the same.”


Hitler vs Stalin: Who Was Worse?

Timothy Snyder

As we recall the Red Army’s liberation of Auschwitz on January 27, 1945, sixty-six years ago today, we might ask: who was worse, Hitler or Stalin?

In the second half of the twentieth century, Americans were taught to see both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as the greatest of evils. Hitler was worse, because his regime propagated the unprecedented horror of the Holocaust, the attempt to eradicate an entire people on racial grounds. Yet Stalin was also worse, because his regime killed far, far more people—tens of millions, it was often claimed—in the endless wastes of the Gulag. For decades, and even today, this confidence about the difference between the two regimes—quality versus quantity—has set the ground rules for the politics of memory. Even historians of the Holocaust generally take for granted that Stalin killed more people than Hitler, thus placing themselves under greater pressure to stress the special character of the Holocaust, since this is what made the Nazi regime worse than the Stalinist one.

Discussion of numbers can blunt our sense of the horrific personal character of each killing and the irreducible tragedy of each death. As anyone who has lost a loved one knows, the difference between zero and one is an infinity. Though we have a harder time grasping this, the same is true for the difference between, say, 780,862 and 780,863—which happens to be the best estimate of the number of people murdered at Treblinka. Large numbers matter because they are an accumulation of small numbers: that is, precious individual lives. Today, after two decades of access to Eastern European archives, and thanks to the work of German, Russian, Israeli, and other scholars, we can resolve the question of numbers. The total number of noncombatants killed by the Germans—about 11 million—is roughly what we had thought. The total number of civilians killed by the Soviets, however, is considerably less than we had believed. We know now that the Germans killed more people than the Soviets did. That said, the issue of quality is more complex than was once thought. Mass murder in the Soviet Union sometimes involved motivations, especially national and ethnic ones, that can be disconcertingly close to Nazi motivations.

It turns out that, with the exception of the war years, a very large majority of people who entered the Gulag left alive. Judging from the Soviet records we now have, the number of people who died in the Gulag between 1933 and 1945, while both Stalin and Hitler were in power, was on the order of a million, perhaps a bit more. The total figure for the entire Stalinist period is likely between two million and three million. The Great Terror and other shooting actions killed no more than a million people, probably a bit less. The largest human catastrophe of Stalinism was the famine of 1930–1933, in which more than five million people starved.

Of those who starved, the 3.3 million or so inhabitants of Soviet Ukraine who died in 1932 and 1933 were victims of a deliberate killing policy related to nationality. In early 1930, Stalin had announced his intention to “liquidate” prosperous peasants (“kulaks”) as a class so that the state could control agriculture and use capital extracted from the countryside to build industry. Tens of thousands of people were shot by Soviet state police and hundreds of thousands deported. Those who remained lost their land and often went hungry as the state requisitioned food for export. The first victims of starvation were the nomads of Soviet Kazakhstan, where about 1.3 million people died. The famine spread to Soviet Russia and peaked in Soviet Ukraine. Stalin requisitioned grain in Soviet Ukraine knowing that such a policy would kill millions. Blaming Ukrainians for the failure of his own policy, he ordered a series of measures—such as sealing the borders of that Soviet republic—that ensured mass death.

In 1937, as his vision of modernization faltered, Stalin ordered the Great Terror. Because we now have the killing orders and the death quotas, inaccessible so long as the Soviet Union existed, we now know that the number of victims was not in the millions. We also know that, as in the early 1930s, the main victims were the peasants, many of them survivors of hunger and of concentration camps. The highest Soviet authorities ordered 386,798 people shot in the “Kulak Operation” of 1937–1938. The other major “enemies” during these years were people belonging to national minorities who could be associated with states bordering the Soviet Union: some 247,157 Soviet citizens were killed by the NKVD in ethnic shooting actions.

In the largest of these, the “Polish Operation” that began in August 1937, 111,091 people accused of espionage for Poland were shot. In all, 682,691 people were killed during the Great Terror, to which might be added a few hundred thousand more Soviet citizens shot in smaller actions. The total figure of civilians deliberately killed under Stalinism, around six million, is of course horribly high. But it is far lower than the estimates of twenty million or more made before we had access to Soviet sources. At the same time, we see that the motives of these killing actions were far more often national, or even ethnic, than we had assumed. Indeed it was Stalin, not Hitler, who initiated the first ethnic killing campaigns in interwar Europe.

Until World War II, Stalin’s regime was by far the more murderous of the two. Nazi Germany began to kill on the Soviet scale only after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the summer of 1939 and the joint German-Soviet invasion of Poland that September. About 200,000 Polish civilians were killed between 1939 and 1941, with each regime responsible for about half of those deaths. This figure includes about 50,000 Polish citizens shot by German security police and soldiers in the fall of 1939, the 21,892 Polish citizens shot by the Soviet NKVD in the Katyn massacres of spring 1940, and the 9,817 Polish citizens shot in June 1941 in a hasty NKVD operation after Hitler betrayed Stalin and Germany attacked the USSR. Under cover of the war and the occupation of Poland, the Nazi regime also killed the handicapped and others deemed unfit in a large-scale “euthanasia” program that accounts for 200,000 deaths. It was this policy that brought asphyxiation by carbon monoxide to the fore as a killing technique.

Beyond the numbers killed remains the question of intent. Most of the Soviet killing took place in times of peace, and was related more or less distantly to an ideologically-informed vision of modernization. Germany bears the chief responsibility for the war, and killed civilians almost exclusively in connection with the practice of racial imperialism. Germany invaded the Soviet Union with elaborate colonization plans. Thirty million Soviet citizens were to starve, and tens of millions more were to be shot, deported, enslaved, or assimilated. Such plans, though unfulfilled, provided the rationale for the bloodiest occupation in the history of the world. The Germans placed Soviet prisoners of war in starvation camps, where 2.6 million perished from hunger and another half million (disproportionately Soviet Jews) were shot. A million Soviet citizens also starved during the siege of Leningrad. In “reprisals” for partisan action, the Germans killed about 700,000 civilians in grotesque mass executions, most of them Belarusians and Poles. At the war’s end the Soviets killed tens of thousands of people in their own “reprisals,” especially in the Baltic nations, Belarus, and Ukraine. Some 363,000 German soldiers died in Soviet captivity.

Hitler came to power with the intention of eliminating the Jews from Europe; the war in the east showed that this could be achieved by mass killing. Within weeks of the attack by Germany (and its Finnish, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, and other allies) on the USSR, Germans, with local help, were exterminating entire Jewish communities. By December 1941, when it appears that Hitler communicated his wish that all Jews be murdered, perhaps a million Jews were already dead in the occupied Soviet Union. Most had been shot over pits, but thousands were asphyxiated in gas vans. From 1942, carbon monoxide was used at the death factories Chełmno, Bełżec, Sobibór, and Treblinka to kill Polish and some other European Jews. As the Holocaust spread to the rest of occupied Europe, other Jews were gassed by hydrogen cyanide at Auschwitz-Birkenau.

Overall, the Germans, with much local assistance, deliberately murdered about 5.4 million Jews, roughly 2.6 million by shooting and 2.8 million by gassing (about a million at Auschwitz, 780,863 at Treblinka, 434,508 at Bełz˙ec, about 180,000 at Sobibór, 150,000 at Chełmno, 59,000 at Majdanek, and the rest in gas vans in occupied Serbia and the occupied Soviet Union). A few hundred thousand more Jews died during deportations to ghettos or of hunger or disease in ghettos. Another 300,000 Jews were murdered by Germany’s ally Romania. Most Holocaust victims had been Polish or Soviet citizens before the war (3.2 million and 1 million respectively). The Germans also killed more than a hundred thousand Roma.

All in all, the Germans deliberately killed about 11 million noncombatants, a figure that rises to more than 12 million if foreseeable deaths from deportation, hunger, and sentences in concentration camps are included. For the Soviets during the Stalin period, the analogous figures are approximately six million and nine million. These figures are of course subject to revision, but it is very unlikely that the consensus will change again as radically as it has since the opening of Eastern European archives in the 1990s. Since the Germans killed chiefly in lands that later fell behind the Iron Curtain, access to Eastern European sources has been almost as important to our new understanding of Nazi Germany as it has been to research on the Soviet Union itself. (In Germany itself, the Nazis killed approximately 165,000 Jews.)

Apart from the inacessibilty of archives, why were our earlier assumptions so wrong? One explanation is the cold war. Our wartime and postwar European alliances, after all, required a certain amount of moral and thus historical flexibility. In 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union were military allies. By the end of 1941, after the Germans had attacked the Soviet Union and Japan the United States, Moscow in effect had traded Berlin for Washington. By 1949, the alliances had switched again, with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany together inNATO, facing off against the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, including the smaller German Democratic Republic. During the cold war, it was sometimes hard for Americans to see clearly the particular evils of Nazis and Soviets. Hitler had brought about a Holocaust: but Germans were now our allies. Stalin too had killed millions of people: but the some of the worst episodes, taking place as they had before the war, had already been downplayed in wartime US propaganda, when we were on the same side.

We formed an alliance with Stalin right at the end of the most murderous years of Stalinism, and then allied with a West German state a few years after the Holocaust. It was perhaps not surprising that in this intellectual environment a certain compromise position about the evils of Hitler and Stalin—that both, in effect, were worse—emerged and became the conventional wisdom.

New understandings of numbers, of course, are only a part of any comparison, and in themselves pose new questions of both quantity and quality. How to count the battlefield casualties of World War II in Europe, not considered here? It was a war that Hitler wanted, and so German responsibility must predominate; but in the event it began with a German-Soviet alliance and a cooperative invasion of Poland in 1939. Somewhere near the Stalinist ledger must belong the thirty million or more Chinese starved during the Great Leap Forward, as Mao followed Stalin’s model of collectivization. The special quality of Nazi racism is not diluted by the historical observation that Stalin’s motivations were sometimes national or ethnic. The pool of evil simply grows deeper.

The most fundamental proximity of the two regimes, in my view, is not ideological but geographical. Given that the Nazis and the Stalinists tended to kill in the same places, in the lands between Berlin and Moscow, and given that they were, at different times, rivals, allies, and enemies, we must take seriously the possibility that some of the death and destruction wrought in the lands between was their mutual responsibility. What can we make of the fact, for example, that the lands that suffered most during the war were those occupied not once or twice but three times: by the Soviets in 1939, the Germans in 1941, and the Soviets again in 1944?

The Holocaust began when the Germans provoked pogroms in June and July 1941, in which some 24,000 Jews were killed, on territories in Poland annexed by the Soviets less than two years before. The Nazis planned to eliminate the Jews in any case, but the prior killings by the NKVD certainly made it easier for local gentiles to justify their own participation in such campaigns. As I have written in Bloodlands, where all of the major Nazi and Soviet atrocities are discussed, we see, even during the German-Soviet war, episodes of belligerent complicity in which one side killed more because provoked or in some sense aided by the other. Germans took so many Soviet prisoners of war in part because Stalin ordered his generals not to retreat. The Germans shot so many civilians in part because Soviet partisans deliberately provoked reprisals. The Germans shot more than a hundred thousand civilians in Warsaw in 1944 after the Soviets urged the locals to rise up and then declined to help them. In Stalin’s Gulag some 516,543 people died between 1941 and 1943, sentenced by the Soviets to labor, but deprived of food by the German invasion.

Were these people victims of Stalin or of Hitler? Or both?

http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/jan/27/hitler-vs-stalin-who-was-worse/

კირიონ II: საქართველოს ეკლესიის საკითხი რუსი მღვდელმთავრებისა და რუს მეცნიერთა წინააღმდეგ

ყოველგვარ მოვლენას, თუ რამდენად ხდება დროში მისი სრულყოფილება, აქვს თავისი ისტორია. თავისი ღრმად შესასწავლი ისტორია აქვს ასევე ჩვენს მრავალტანჯული ეკლესიის ავტოკეფალიასაც. ეს საკითხი, რომელიც ასე მოულოდნელად წამოიჭრა ბეჭდვით ორგანოებში, ბოლო დროს ჩამოყალიბდა მთელი ლიტერატურის სახით. საქართველოს ეკლესიის ავტოკეფალიის აღდგენას ჰყავს მომხრეებიც და მოწინააღმდეგენიც. სერიოზული და კეთილსინდისიერი გამოკვლევების გვერდით, როგორც მოსალოდნელი იყო, გამოჩნდა ტენდენციური წერილები, უფრო კი ფარისევლური ცნობები მწიგნობრებისა, ცრუგანმმარტებლებისა, საქართველოს ეკლესიის ავტოკეფალიის საკითხის მრუდედ და ცალმხრივად განმხილველთა. ზოგიერთი იქამდეც კი მივიდა, რომ დაუშვებელ, უხეშად გაყალბებულ ფაქტებს მოუყარა თავი და წინასწარ განზრახული გეგმით დაამახინჯა აზრები. მიუხედავად ამისა, სიცრუის ხელოვნურად შექმნილი ბურუსი მაინც გააპო ჭეშმარიტებამ, მათი მცდელობა კი უნაყოფო გამოდგა.

ქართულ, ბერძნულ, სირიულ (ასურულ) და არაბულენოვანი ისტორიული საბუთები ადასტურებენ იმ ფაქტს, რომ ქართველებმა ქრისტიანობა II საუკუნეში მიიღეს, ხოლო იერარქია და საეკლესიო-ადმინისტრაციული დაწესებულებები ბიზანტიისაგან გადმოიღეს. შემდეგში საქართველოს ეკლესია შევიდა ანტიოქიის საყდრის იურისდიქციაში. მიუხედავად ამისა, საქართველოს ეკლესია ყოველთვის ცდილობდა გათავისუფლებულიყო მეტროპოლიის საეკლესიო ზედამხედველობისაგან და ორგანიზაციულად ჩამოეყალიბებინა დამოუკიდებელი, ეროვნული ეკლესია კათოლიკოსით სათავეში. ასეთი, სრულიად ბუნებრივი, თავისთავადი მისწრაფება ქართველებისა, განხორციელებადი იყო იმიტომ, რომ ქართველები უკვე სრულიად განიმსჭვალენ ქრისტიანული რელიგიის მაცხოვნებელი სწავლებით. ერთის მხრივ, ივერიაში გამოჩნდა ეროვნული საეკლესიო-რელიგიური ცენტრები, სასულიერო- საგანმანათლებლო წიგნები. მეორეს მხრივ, საქართველოს სამეფოს თანდათანობითი გაძლიერება, განსაკუთრებით არაბების მიერ ანტიოქიის აღების შემდეგ – 638 წელს, ქართველებში იწვევდა მისწრაფებას, რომ თავისი მშობლიური ეკლესია ექციათ ანტიოქიის პატრიარქისგან სრულიად დამოუკიდებლად. ეს წმიდა სურვილი ქართველებისა თანდათანობით აღსრულდა. საქართველოს ეკლესიამ გაიარა განვითარების ყველა საფეხური მანამ, სანამ არ მოხდა სადღესასწაულო უწყება: VIII საუკუნის შუახანებში (751 წელს) ანტიოქიის საპატრიარქოს კათედრის (საყდრის) კრების განწესებით, ცნობილი იქნა ივერიის ეკლესიის სრული ავტოკეფალია. ამ დროიდან აღიარებენ და მოიხსენიებენ მცხეთის ეკლესიას ავტოკეფალურ და საკათალიკოსო კათედრად, როგორც დასავლეთის, ისე აღმოსავლეთის ეკლესიები და საეკლესიო კანონისტები თუ ისტორიკოსები. ვისაც სურს დაწვრილებით ჩაუღრმავდეს ამ საკითხებს, ვურჩევთ გაეცნოს სპეციალურ თხზულებებს, რომელიც საქართველოს ეკლესიის ავტოკეფალიის საკითხს ეხება: 1) სანკტ-პეტერბურგის სასულიერო აკადემიის პროფესორის ი. ი. სოკოლოვის “საქართველოს ეკლესიის ავტოკეფალიის საკითხზე” (ისტორიული ცნობა); 2) კ. ცინცაძის “საქართველოს ეკლესიის ავტოკეფალია” (თბილისი, 1905 წელი); 3) თ. ჟორდანიას “მოკლე ისტორიული ცნობა საქართველოს ეკლესიის ავტოკეფალიაზე” (თბილისი, 1905 წელი); 4) ს. გორგაძე; 5) ეწტსქუდშთძფ “სიმართლე საქართველოს ეკლესიის ავტოკეფალიაზე” (ქუთაისი. 1906 წელი) და პროფესორების ღირებული მრავალრიცხოვანი საგაზეთო სტატიები: ა. ა. ცაგარელისა, ნ. მარისა, ა. ს. ხახანოვისა, აგრეთვე ნ. ნ. დურნოვოსი, ი. გოგებაშვილისა, ა. ყიფშიძისა, ა. ნატროევისა, ი. ფერაძესი, მღვდლებისა: ნ. პოკროვსკისა, კ. კეკელიძისა, ი. ჩიჯავაძისა, იონა ბრიხნევჩისა და სხვათა.

 

ასე რომ, IIII საუკუნის შუახანებიდან 1811 წლამდე საქართველოს ეკლესია სრულიად თავისუფალი იყო. კათოლიკოსები განაგებდნენ ეკლესიას რომელიმე გარე სახელმწიფოს ხელისუფლებისაგან დამოუკიდებლად, უფლის სიტყვის საფუძველზე, მოციქულთა კანონებითა და საეკლესიო კანონებით; საკუთარი ინიციატივით იწვევდნენ ადგილობრივ საეკლესიო კრებებს, სადაც ხდებოდა საეკლესიო გადაწყვეტილებების მიღება. მაგრამ მას შემდეგ, რაც საქართველოს სამეფო ნებაყოფლობით შეუერთდა რუსეთის სახელმწიფოს 1801 წელს, რუსეთის წმიდა სინოდი ვერ შეეგუა იმას, რომ საქართველოს ეკლესიას ჰყავდა დამოუკიდებელი კათოლიკოსი, ხოლო მანამდე გამოცემულ იმპერატორ პავლე I-ის რესკრიპტში კი ეწერა: “არ შეეხოთ საქართველოს ეკლესიის პრივილეგიას”. დაიწყო ბრძოლა საქართველოს ეკლესიის იერარქიული დამორჩილებისთვის. სულ მალე წმიდა სინოდის განზრახვა წარმატებით დასრულდა.

საქართველოში რუსეთის ჯარების მთავარსარდლის, სამხედრო გენერლის ტორმასოვის მეოხებით კათოლიკოსი ანტონ II 1810 წელს გამოძახებული იქნა წმიდა სინოდში საქართველოს ეკლესიის საქმეების მოწესრიგების მიზნით. უკვე 1811 წლის 30 ივნისს, იგივე გენერალ ტორმასოვის სურვილისამებრ, მის ადგილზე, წმინდა მოციქულების 30-ე და 35-ე კანონებისა და ანტიოქიის კრების 22-ე კანონის საწინააღმდეგოდ, საქართველოს ეგზარქოსად და მცხეთის მიტროპოლიტად დაინიშნა ვარლამი (ერისთავი). მხოლოდ დიდსა და უძველეს ეკლესიას ძალუძს შეცვალოს განჩინება მცირე ხელისუფლებისა. ასე რომ, დარღვეულია საეკლესიო კანონები. ჩადენილი იქნა ჯერ არ გაგონილი უსამართლობა, რომლის ანალოგი ეკლესიის ისტორიაში არ მოიძებნება.

ისმის კითხვა: ჰქონდა კი კანონიკური უფლება წმიდა სინოდს ასე მოქცეოდა საქართველოს ეკლესიის ავტოკეფალიას….

აღნიშნული საკითხის გარკვევისათვის კვლავ მივუბრუნდები ეკლესიის ისტორიას. ჩვენ მასში მართალია ვიპოვით მცირე შემთხვევებს ავტოკეფალიის გაუქმებისას, მაგრამ ამისთვის აუცილებელი მოთხოვნა იყო ზემოთ ხსენებული პირობების დაცვა: ერთის მხრივ, ნებაყოფლობითი სურვილი მოქმედი სამღვდელოებისა, სხვა მხრივ, კი კრების სანქციით. მაგრამ მსგავსი რამ სინოდს არ გაუკეთებია. თუკი იარსებებდა რაიმე სახის აქტი საქართველოს ეკლესიის მხრიდან თავისი ავტოკეფალური უფლებების ნებაყოფლობით უარყოფისა, მაშინ უკვე წმიდა სინოდს ექნებოდა რამენაირი გამართლება იმ მოქმედებისა, რაც საქართველოს ეკლესიის მიმართ ჩაიდინა. მაგრამ არანაირი მსგავსი აქტი არ ყოფილა. ერთადერთი შესაძლებელი გზა საქართველოს ეკლესიის საკითხის კანონიკური გადაწყვეტისა, იყო ორმხრივი შეთანხმება, ორივე მხარის მიერ შედგენილი აქტი, მაგრამ ეს სავსებით კანონიერი გზა უგულებელყოფილი იქნა უმაღლესი ცენტრალური სასულიერო მართვა-გამგეობის მიერ. მოცემულ შემთხვევაში თავის მართლებისათვის არ გამოდგება დამოწმება ფორმულისა: “ასე იყო ამ დრომდე”. ამ ფრაზას უფრო ისტორიული მნიშვნელობა აქვს, ვიდრე იურიდიული შინაარსი. უკანონო მოქმედება საქართველოს ეკლესიასთან მიმართებაში არ შეიძლება დაკანონდეს იმ მოტივით, რომ მას ადგილი ჰქონდა დიდი ხნის წინათ. საერო სფეროში მიღებულ უკანონობის ხანდაზმულობით გამართლებას ჩვენ საეკლესიო საკითხთან საერთო არაფერი აქვს.

წმიდა სინოდი ძირითადად დაეყრდნო გენერალ ტორმასოვის დასმენებს და მიუხედავად იმისა, რომ არ ჰქონდა უზენაესი უფლებამოსილება, ჩაერია უძველესი ეკლესიის საქმეებში, რომელიც გამტკიცებული იყო ანტიოქიის კრების განჩინებით, თავისი ავტოკეფალური უფლებებით. მსოფლიო საეკლესიო კრებების კანონები ყოველთვის უფრთხილდებოდნენ ცალკეული ეკლესიების დამოუკიდებლობას და მათ იურისდიქციას, როგორც ეს დადასტურებულია კონსტანტინეპოლის კრების მე-2 კანონში, ეფესოს კრების მე-8 კანონში, წმიდა მოციქულების 35-ე კანონში და ა.შ.

ჩვენ კიდევ ერთ მოსაზრებას წარმოვადგენთ. შეიძლება ითქვას, რომ ეს კანონიკური წესები, დოგმატის მსგავსად არ არის უცვლელი. ისინი არაერთხელ შეიცვალნენ დროისა და ადგილის მოთხოვნების თანახმად. მართალია ეს კანონები შემდეგში შეიძლება ჩამოყალიბდეს სხვა ფორმულირებით, მაგრამ ზემოთ აღნიშნული მოქმედების მსგავსი რაიმეს განხორციელება კერძო ეკლესიის კომპენტენციაში არ შედის. ის შეუძლებელია, თუ არ იქნება გათვალისწინებული მსოფლიო კრებების მიერ დაწესებული სანქციები. მხოლოდ მას აქვს ამის უფლება.

ასე რომ, კანონიკური და ისტორიული მონაცემების საფუძველზე უკანონოდ შეჩერებული საქართველოს ეკლესიის კათოლიკოსის არჩევა, დაუყოვნებლივ უნდა განახლდეს და აღდგეს საქართველოს ეკლესიის სრული ავტოკეფალია, რომელიც ივერიის ეკლესიას დაუბრუნებს სამართლიანობას მისი ცხოვრების ყველა სფეროში.

 

Holocaust, Nazis and Soviets

Look Again – “Shoah” and a new view of history.

by David Denby
Claude Lanzmann’s nine-hour documentary on the Holocaust is being re-released.

Claude Lanzmann’s “Shoah,” the shattering nine-hour documentary about the Holocaust, which was first shown in New York in 1985, has, on its twenty-fifth anniversary, reopened here and will soon appear in museums, universities, and select theatres across the country. Back in 1985, the film left me bruised and sore, moved by its clarifying passions and its electrifying rhetoric, and amazed by its revolutionary form. Lanzmann, a French filmmaker and intellectual journalist, omitted photographs, newsreels, and documents (all the usual historical materials), and, instead, reconstructed the past from what remained of it in the present. He used the testimony of three groups of people: survivors of the death camps in Poland, most of them Jews who worked for the Nazis and either escaped or outlived the camps at the end of the war; Nazi guards and functionaries; and Polish witnesses, some of them farmers living near the camps who respond to memory with a bemused shrug and a few smiles, others villagers who make typical anti-Semitic remarks. And Lanzmann filmed, with obsessive precision and poetic eloquence, the physical remnants, the trains, tracks, and roads that conveyed prisoners to Treblinka, Sobibor, and Auschwitz-Birkenau—camps that the Poles left standing, half as memorial sites and half as cursed and loathsome wastelands, and whose environs and interiors he crosses and crisscrosses. All this was fascinating, but I wondered whether seeing “Shoah” again could teach audiences anything new. And was there not a possible moral danger in fascination—the habit of returning to the Jewish catastrophe over and over for an emotional workout without receiving further illumination from it?

There is, however, a startling new interpretation of the period which makes another viewing of “Shoah” necessary not as an immersion in sorrows but as a fresh experience. A few months ago, Timothy Snyder, a professor of history at Yale, brought out a stunning book called “Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin” (Basic; $29.95), which chronicles not just the Holocaust but also the many mass killings perpetrated during the years 1933 to 1945 by both the Nazis and the Soviets, especially in eastern Poland, the Baltic states, and areas nominally within the Soviet Union, such as Ukraine and Belarus. Parts or all of this vast territory were stormed by armies and occupied no less than three times: first, by the Red Army, after the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 in effect ceded eastern Poland and the Baltic states to the Soviet Union; then, beginning in June, 1941, by the German attack on the same lands, an assault by three million men which subsequently advanced deep into the Soviet Union; and then, of course, by the Soviet counterattack and “liberation,” which expelled the Germans from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1944 and 1945. Each army was accompanied by killing units: the Nazis by S.S. death squads, German “security police,” and local thugs who were recruited, or intimidated, into doing their part; the Soviets by the secret police—the N.K.V.D.—which, in 1939 (and after), continued the mass exterminations begun on Stalin’s orders in the early thirties, when five and a half million people, most of them in Ukraine, were starved to death. In all, from 1933 to 1945, fourteen million noncombatants died in what Snyder calls the “bloodlands.”

As Snyder demonstrates, the Nazis and the Soviets may have been trying to destroy each other in the ferocious combat of 1941 to 1945, but, if one looks at the entire thirteen-year period that he describes, the two totalitarian powers occasionally acted in a kind of weird concert, in which each side emboldened or even enabled the other. For instance, when the Soviets murdered twenty-two thousand Polish reserve officers in the Katyn forest, in 1940, they were mirroring the German slaughter of the Polish professional classes in German-occupied western Poland. And when the Polish Home Army revolted against the Germans in occupied Warsaw, in 1944, the Soviets, who had encouraged the uprising, fought and defeated the Germans outside the city but then waited for months as the Nazis crushed the Poles inside it. When the Soviets finally entered Warsaw, they not only routed the Germans but, with the help of Polish Communists, suppressed the surviving anti-Nazis, thereby finishing the job of subduing the spirit of Polish independence. Without diminishing in any way the Jewish Holocaust, Snyder insists that it should not be seen as separate from the many other mass slaughters of civilians—the millions of Poles, Belarusians, Balts, and Ukrainians killed for political or ideological reasons, or merely because they were an encumbrance that needed to be cleared away to make space for German or Soviet occupancy.

That kind of large-scale historical account is certainly not what Lanzmann intended. “Shoah” is solely about the war against the Jews. It is, in fact, devoted to one aspect of that war—the transportation of Jews from various corners of Europe to the extermination centers in Poland and the killings by gas, first at Chelmno, where mobile vans were used, and then at Treblinka, Sobibor, and Auschwitz-Birkenau, with their gas chambers and crematoriums. From Lanzmann’s movie, you would not know that by the time of the Wannsee Conference, in Berlin, in January, 1942, in which the Final Solution was openly plotted by the S.S., perhaps a million Jews had already been killed, mainly by shootings in the places where they lived, the bodies dumped into pits and buried. Roughly as many Jews were killed by bullets as by gas in the Holocaust, a fact not widely known to this day. Certainly, we need to know everything, understand everything, feel everything. Snyder’s book, by making an original account of the period in copious detail laid out in sombrely blunt declarative sentences, should expand these three faculties in anyone who engages its grim but lucid exposition. His point about the Jewish tragedy, as I understand it, is that you can’t get the Holocaust straight if you don’t get the entire history of the period straight.

What he doesn’t emphasize (he says it in passing) is that Hitler’s war against the Jews was an attempt to eliminate an entire people—to efface their identity altogether—whereas Stalin’s campaign against, say, Ukraine was an attempt to eliminate not all Ukrainians but those who conceivably might resist collectivization and the triumph of Communism. But it serves no purpose to get into a competition of horrors, or a competition of chroniclers. Snyder is a historian, and Lanzmann an artist; they are doing different things. Watching “Shoah” again, I recognized, with Snyder’s help, the specialized nature of what it establishes, but its force was not lessened. By relying on the testimony of participants, Lanzmann brought the past into the present—the eternal present, renewed in the act of existential re-creation before the camera. The Nazis offer themselves sometimes hesitatingly, sometimes proudly, with coy avowals of pity for the Jews, or with outrageous pity for themselves as overworked executioners; the survivors speak with hallucinatory vividness. One of them, Filip Müller, a Slovak Jew, was twenty when he was a member of a special work detail at Auschwitz. He describes the layout of the gas chamber; at the same time, Lanzmann’s camera, as if entering Hell itself, moves in flickering light through the chamber. In a second narrative, devoted to his time down the road at Birkenau, Müller describes his desolation when a group of Czechs, who had been kept alive for some months, suddenly faced death, and Müller, no longer able to bear what he was doing (clearing out and burning the bodies), joined them in the chamber, only to be told by several of the women about to die that he had to survive and tell the world what he had seen. Müller’s two stories, in their precision and their melding of horror and emotional saturation, are beyond anything that fiction has given us in the cinema.

Again and again, Lanzmann goes into Birkenau, filming with his camera on the track, passing first through the entrance—a squared-off opening in a long horizontal building—and then stopping at the ramp, where the passengers were unloaded. This is a visionary film that stubbornly traverses the ground. In Pauline Kael’s almost comically obtuse negative review of the movie, published in this magazine, she said of Lanzmann that “the heart of his obsession appears to be to show you that the Gentiles will do it again to the Jews if they get the chance.” But the notion that the Holocaust might happen again is exactly what “Shoah” is not about. It’s about the enormity of its happening once. “Shoah” is a topographic work. Where, specifically, did the trains stop at Sobibor? How many feet was it to the entrance to the camp? Sobibor is now just a scraggly field, but Lanzmann measures the distance, paces it off. He doesn’t ask how morality could have accommodated the Holocaust. He asks how reality could have accommodated it. Far from being a limited work, “Shoah” becomes an enraged metaphysical protest against the nature of existence itself. ♦

http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/cinema/2011/01/10/110110crci_cinema_denby?printable=true#ixzz1ANXUClbC

Voices of Liberty

In and around 1991, David Botsford recorded a series of interviews for a programme that he called “Voices of Liberty”. Those he interviewed … all » included many in the British libertarian movement, together with several prominent critics of libertarianism. The programme was never made.

Interview with Roger Scruton, 1991

Interview with Norman Barry

Interview with Kenneth Minogue

Interview with Ralph, Lord Harris

Interview with Iain Smedley and Bunny Galloway

Interview with Robert Lefever

Interview with Sean Gabb

Interview with Chris R. Tame

Interview with Patrick Minford

Interview with Ian Anderson

Interview with Sydney Parker

Interview with a Green

Interview with Kevin McFarlane

Interview with Tim Evans

Interview with Ron Miller

Interview with Judy Englander (Tame)

Interview with Paul Michael

Interview with Bob and Sarah Taylor

Interview with Barry MacLeod-Cullinane

Interview with David Marquand

Interview with Jeremy Seabrook

Interview with Raymond Plant

Interview with Brian Micklethwait

Interview with Phillip Loades

Libertarian Alliance Conference on Children’s Right

Россия без Петра – Юлия Латынина

Меня всегда изумляло в споре между западниками и славянофилами вопрос: а нужен ли нам был Петр Первый, а вот Россия – это Европа, или Азия, а не лучше ли было бы без Петра?

Должна сказать, что без Петра Первого России бы просто не было. Потому что, напомню – Европа до 20 века – это время безграничной экспансии и колонизации. Это время, когда малейшее военное превосходство оборачивается гигантским территориальным прибытком. И без Петра российской империи, культуры и цивилизации – в том виде, в котором она сформировалась в 18-19 веке, просто не существовало бы. Просто задумаемся, как бы выглядела без Петра Великого карта Европы к началу 20 века.

На ней была бы еще одна великая держава, в дополнение к Англии и Франции. Эта держава зарекомендовала себя как первоклассная военная держава в 30-летней войне – она называется Швеция. Помимо Норвегии и Финляндии, Швеция владела бы, скорее всего, всей Прибалтикой, а также Ленинградской, Псковской, Новгородской, Архангельской областью, и республикой Коми. Все, что выходит к воде – потому что шведы прекрасные корабелы, и вообще Балтийское море, скорее всего, было бы внутренним морем Северной Шведской империей – как Средиземное море было внутренним морем Римской империи.

Архангельск и Мурманск были бы шведскими портами, вопрос, кому бы принадлежали континентальные земли вдоль севера Евразии – там, где у нас Норильск и газ. Во всяком случае, понятно, что шведские моряки, которые искали бы Северный морской путь, имели бы не меньше шансов проникнуть на эти земли, нежели русские из московского царства.

В центре Европы существовала бы еще одна крупная славянская держава, называемая Польша. Как вы понимаете, никакого раздела Пельши не было бы, потому что делить было бы некому. Условно бы говоря, Польша приняла бы свою конституцию 3 мая 1791 г. – первую в Европе, и к началу 20 века, скорее всего, включала бы в себя, как минимум. Смоленскую область.

Существовала бы еще одна крупная европейская славянская держава, с центром в Киеве. Трудно сказать, была бы эта славянская держава с центром в Киеве завоевана другой славянской державой с центром в Варшаве – во всяком случае, московского царства с его стрельцами шанс на завоевание Украины был бы равен нулю.

Вдоль Черного моря, от Краснодарского края до Абхазии, существовало бы государство, которое, скорее всего, называлось бы Великой Черкесией. Потому что к 19 веку адыги, которые обитали вдоль Черного моря, находились в крайне неестественном состоянии: очень высокая степень культуры при крайне низкой степени государственности. Скорее, рано или поздно, государство адыгское было бы сформировано, – причем, не обязательно мусульманское – мусульманами адыги стали именно в ходе борьбы с Россией. Так или иначе, шансы стрельцов Московского царства на завоевание Кавказа и геноцид адыгов, – а то, что сделала Россия, очистив себе физически земли вдоль Черного моря – в своем стремлении к Константинополю это был практически геноцид, – шансы эти были бы равны нулю.

Закавказье – два варианта: возможно, турки подчинили бы себе Армению и Грузию, как они подчинили бы себе Болгарию, возможен второй вариант: Оттоманская империя была бы уничтожена еще в 19 веке, потому что это был вечный больной Европы, который поддерживали именно как буфер против Российской империи. В таком случае Грузия и Армения стали бы просто форпостом европейской цивилизации в Закавказье, – в любом случае никакого Георгиевского трактата и союза с Российской империей – за неимением последней.

Теперь посмотрим на Дальний Восток. Те же исторические условия: Московское царство, которое не претерпело никаких реформ и реформированная Япония. Ответ очевиден: не то, что Сахалин, – а Камчатка. Приморье были бы японскими. Была бы, скорее всего, колонизация Японией Дальнего Востока, как колонизация островом Японией материка дальнего Востока, как колонизация Англией материка североамериканского.

То есть, если бы и была русско-японская война в 1905 году, то кончилась бы она не Цусимой, а потерей всего Дальнего Востока – такой визит Коммодора Перри наоборот.

Другая граница с Китаем была бы. Хотя, конечно, Китай в 19 веке не в том состоянии был, чтобы прирастать территориями. Но напомню, что значительное количество народов между Россией и Китаем перешло в подданство Российской империи добровольно – чтобы защититься от маньчжуров. Например, алтайцы в 1756 г. сами попросились под Белого царя от тех же маньчжуров. Понятно, что стрельцы Московского царства – где Алтай и где Москва – защитить алтайцев без реформы военной, экономической и административной, – шанс был равен нулю.

Через два года после Алтая Российская империя присоединила к себе Хакасию окончательно. Опять же, трудно себе представить, чтобы Бурятия – буряты – те же монголы, – вошла в состав Московского царства. И два вариант развития событий: либо российские казаки, которые уходили на Дальний Восток, образовывали бы собственное царство, либо местные автохтонные народы – якуты или тунгусы – образовывали бы собственные ханства.

Еще раз повторяю – России бы просто не было без реформ Петра Первого. Не было бы не то, что города Санкт-Петербурга, или покорение Крыма – тем более, что Крым мы опять прохлопали. Не было бы самой Российской империи, как нет империи инков. Потому что даже Китай, с его тысячелетней историей, великой культурой, влачил к 19 веку призрачное существование.

Московское царство – бестолковое, тугодумное, архаическое образование, – обмылок расколовшейся Монгольской империи – просто не имело бы никаких шансов. Как естественная область колонизации со стороны технически превосходящих европейских держав.

Вот так же, как Англия колонизовала Индию. Швеция и Польша колонизовали бы Русь. И я напомню, что армия Великих Моголов или Маратхов, от которых англичане потерпели немало унизительных поражений, были на голову выше разложившихся стрельцов. Просто напомню: 1612 г., Ост-Индская компания создает в Сурате свою колонию, Баффин ищет северо-западный морской проход, ив этом году поляки сидели в Кремле, а шведы заняли всю Новгородчину – это 1612 г., – тогда экспансия Европы только начиналась. Прошло 8 десятков лет, Европа прошла через 30-летнюю войну, создание колоний, могучих флотов, через Английскую революцию, через Декарта, Ньютона, Спинозу – Михаил Федорович и Алексей Михайлович, Тишайшие – не изменили положение в державе ни на йоту, – она как была, условно говоря, средневековой Персией, так и осталась. Оставалась страной бояр, стрелецких мятежей, длинных рукавов.

То есть, если бы дело продолжалось так, то вместо Российской империи, на мой взгляд, была бы некая территория, не имеющая выходу к морю – такая Боливия или Монголия, с соответствующими катастрофическими последствиями, жило бы в ней миллионов 10-20, на западе бы ее теснили Великая Швеция и Великая Польша, вдоль Черного моря жили бы адыги, на востоке выход к морю обрезали бы японские колонии, буфером между ними были бы самостоятельные государства либо русские, либо, допустим, тунгуски.

И не говорите мне при этом, что вот, в Москве уже при Иване Грозном была уже Немецкая слобода – да, была, такие поселения были и в Кантоне, и в Нагасаки. Или, что Алексей Михайлович занимался медленной модернизацией, потому что представление о модернизации у московских бояр были точно такие же, как у нынешних кремлевских опричников: купим на этом басурманском западе, который нас, православных, ненавидит, побольше «Мерседесов», или карет, – вот и все представление о модернизации.

Опять же, не говорите мне, что Петр Первый рубил головы как капусту. Потому что тогда и в Европе рубили головы. Тогда Европа еще не была этим бюрократическим молотом, который рассуждает о пользе политического вегетарианства и которого стремительно обгоняют и нагоняют новые Европы. Потому что, конечно, надо быть ОБСЕ или Евросоюзом, чтобы не заметить, что Китай ведет себя как Европа в 18 веке, или Россия в 19-м, и с теми же блистательными успехами.

И конечно, Россия не Европа – точно так же, как Япония не Европа. Но Россия, – и это, собственно, та духоподъемная мысль, на которой я хочу закончить, – это пример самой поразительной в мире реформы при самых неблагоприятных политических и социальных обстоятельствах. Россия – это дичок навсегда привитой Европой. И толчок, который сообщен был государству Петром Первым, был столь велик, что обратно срезать привитый черенок не смогла не то, что Анны Иоанновна, даже Сталин.

То, что сделал в России Петр первый в конце 17 века, большинство азиатских государств – Южная Корея, Тайвань, Сингапур, Китай – стали делать только в конце 20-го. А огромное количество государств, типа Конго или Боливии, не делают до сих пор. Это был пример исторической прозорливости, который в истории человечества не имеет себе равных. Потому что даже японской цивилизации осознать, что единственный способ выжить – это стать Европой, – даже японской цивилизации на это понадобилось еще полтораста лишних лет.

И Московское царство это не Европа, а Российская империя – это Европа. Кстати, не случайно Санкт-Петербург – копия Стокгольма, кратно превосходящая качеством оригинал. И я это говорю потому, что если в чем сейчас и нуждается Россия, то это в новом Петре Первом. И если у нас будет новый Петр Первый, то у нас все получится.

 

Hitler was a Leftist

“We are socialists, we are enemies of today’s capitalistic economic system for the exploitation of the economically weak, with its unfair salaries, with its unseemly evaluation of a human being according to wealth and property instead of responsibility and performance, and we are all determined to destroy this system under all conditions.” –Adolf Hitler

(Speech of May 1, 1927. Quoted by Adolf Hitler by John Toland, 1976, p. 306)

Red Army shoulder patch with the swastika on it that was used during the Russian Civil War after the Bolshevik Revolution

[Below is the 25 of the NSDAP Program – This is basically the National Socialist German Workers Party Platform. It included measures that in effect would redistribute income and war profits, profit-sharing with large industries, nationalization of trusts, extensive development of old-age pension (just like FDRs Social Security Program), and free education. Clearly this demonstrates Hitler was indeed a left winger and here is startling proof.]

The 25 points of the NSDAP Program were composed by Adolf Hitler and Anton Drexler. They were publically presented on 24 February 1920 “to a crowd of almost two thousand and every single point was accepted amid jubilant approval.” (Mein Kampf, Volume II, Chapter I) Hitler explained their purpose in the fifth chapter of the second volume of Mein Kampf:

[T]he program of the new movement was summed up in a few guiding principles, twenty-five in all. They were devised to give, primarily to the man of the people, a rough picture of the movement’s aims. They are in a sense a political creed, which on the one hand recruits for the movement and on the other is suited to unite and weld together by a commonly recognized obligation those who have been recruited.

Hitler was intent on having a community of mutual interest that desired mutual success instead of one that was divided over the control of money or differing values.

THE COMMON INTEREST BEFORE SELF-INTEREST –
THAT IS THE SPIRIT OF THE PROGRAM. BREAKING OF THE THRALDOM OF INTEREST – THAT IS THE KERNEL OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM.

Soviet Socialist Swastika as two separate arms pointing clockwise, representing separate "S" letters overlapping

In these straightforward statements of intent, Hitler translated his ideology into a plan of action which would prove its popularity with the German people throughout the coming years. For many, the abruptness of its departure from the tradition of politics as practiced in the western world was as much of a shock as its liberal nature and foresight of the emerging problems of western democracy.

The Programme of the German Workers’ Party is designed to be of limited duration. The leaders have no intention, once the aims announced in it have been achieved, of establishing fresh ones, merely in order to increase, artificially, the discontent of the masses and so ensure the continued existence of the Party.

1. We demand the union of all Germany in a Greater Germany on the basis of the right of national self-determination.

2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in its dealings with other nations, and the revocation of the peace treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain.

3. We demand land and territory (colonies) to feed our people and to settle our surplus population.

4. Only members of the nation may be citizens of the State. Only those of German blood, whatever be their creed, may be members of the nation. Accordingly, no Jew may be a member of the nation.

5. Non-citizens may live in Germany only as guests and must be subject to laws for aliens.

6. The right to vote on the State’s government and legislation shall be enjoyed by the citizens of the State alone. We demand therefore that all official appointments, of whatever kind, whether in the Reich, in the states or in the smaller localities, shall be held by none but citizens.

We oppose the corrupting parliamentary custom of filling posts merely in accordance with party considerations, and without reference to character or abilities.

7. We demand that the State shall make it its primary duty to provide a livelihood for its citizens. If it should prove impossible to feed the entire population, foreign nationals (non-citizens) must be deported from the Reich.

8. All non-German immigration must be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who entered Germany after 2 August 1914 shall be required to leave the Reich forthwith.

9. All citizens shall have equal rights and duties.

10. It must be the first duty of every citizen to perform physical or mental work. The activities of the individual must not clash with the general interest, but must proceed within the framework of the community and be for the general good.

We demand therefore:
11. The abolition of incomes unearned by work.

The breaking of the slavery of interest
12. In view of the enormous sacrifices of life and property demanded of a nation by any war, personal enrichment from war must be regarded as a crime against the nation. We demand therefore the ruthless confiscation of all war profits.

13. We demand the nationalization of all businesses which have been formed into corporations (trusts).

14. We demand profit-sharing in large industrial enterprises.

15. We demand the extensive development of insurance for old age.

16. We demand the creation and maintenance of a healthy middle class, the immediate communalizing of big department stores, and their lease at a cheap rate to small traders, and that the utmost consideration shall be shown to all small traders in the placing of State and municiple orders.

17. We demand a land reform suitable to our national requirements, the passing of a law for the expropriation of land for communal purposes without compensation; the abolition of ground rent, and the prohibition of all speculation in land. *

18. We demand the ruthless prosecution of those whose activities are injurious to the common interest. Common criminals, usurers, profiteers, etc., must be punished with death, whatever their creed or race.

19. We demand that Roman Law, which serves a materialistic world order, be replaced by a German common law.

20. The State must consider a thorough reconstruction of our national system of education (with the aim of opening up to every able and hard-working German the possibility of higher education and of thus obtaining advancement). The curricula of all educational establishments must be brought into line with the requirements of practical life. The aim of the school must be to give the pupil, beginning with the first sign of intelligence, a grasp of the nation of the State (through the study of civic affairs). We demand the education of gifted children of poor parents, whatever their class or occupation, at the expense of the State.

21. The State must ensure that the nation’s health standards are raised by protecting mothers and infants, by prohibiting child labor, by promoting physical strength through legislation providing for compulsory gymnastics and sports, and by the extensive support of clubs engaged in the physical training of youth.

22. We demand the abolition of the mercenary army and the foundation of a people’s army.

23. We demand legal warfare on deliberate political mendacity and its dissemination in the press. To facilitate the creation of a German national press we demand:

(a) that all editors of, and contributors to newspapers appearing in the German language must be members of the nation;
(b) that no non-German newspapers may appear without the express permission of the State. They must not be printed in the German language;
(c) that non-Germans shall be prohibited by law from participating financially in or influencing German newspapers, and that the penalty for contravening such a law shall be the suppression of any such newspaper, and the immediate deportation of the non-Germans involved.

The publishing of papers which are not conducive to the national welfare must be forbidden. We demand the legal prosecution of all those tendencies in art and literature which corrupt our national life, and the suppression of cultural events which violate this demand.

24. We demand freedom for all religious denominations in the State, provided they do not threaten its existence not offend the moral feelings of the German race.

The Party, as such, stands for positive Christianity, but does not commit itself to any particular denomination. It combats the Jewish-materialistic spirit within and without us, and is convinced that our nation can achieve permanent health only from within on the basis of the principle: The common interest before self-interest.

25. To put the whole of this programme into effect, we demand the creation of a strong central state power for the Reich; the unconditional authority of the political central Parliament over the entire Reich and its organizations; and the formation of Corporations based on estate and occupation for the purpose of carrying out the general legislation passed by the Reich in the various German states.

The leaders of the Party promise to work ruthlessly — if need be to sacrifice their very lives — to translate this programme into action.

Source: Programme of the NSDAP

WikiLeaks: Ambassador John Bass on Situation in Georgia

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 000203 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, OTRA, OVIP, AF, RS, GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE’S VISIT Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bass for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S) Summary. Georgia is calmer and more stable than at any time since the war, but those improvements are far from durable. A palpable sense of insecurity still permeates society and politics. Miscalculations and provocations – domestically, in the territories or north across the mountains – could easily spark renewed crisis. With a more stable economy and no viable rival, President Saakashvili is stronger politically, but paradoxically more insecure, burdened by the fear history will judge him to have lost irrevocably the occupied territories. He is also concerned our measured approach to defense cooperation and engagement with Moscow presage a deeper reorientation of U.S. interests. These concerns are reinforced by a steady drumbeat of Russian accusations about the legitimacy and behavior of his government and comparative silence from the West about Moscow’s consolidation of its position in the territries. In this hothouse environment, your visit is an important, visible manifestation of the depth of our partnership, and of the enduring commitment of the United States to support Georgia’s aspirations to move west.

2. (S) Much of the government and society are still motivated by the lure of Euro-Atlantic integration. Fears that Georgia will remain in the West’s waiting room in perpetuity have sparked a minority to begin discussing the viability of a deal with Moscow in order to reintegrate the territories. These trial balloons, and Moscow’s ongoing efforts to de-legitimize the government and create more palatable alternatives, further polarize a political environment that encourages zero-sum thinking and hinders deeper democratic and economic reforms. Saakashvili continues to cast about for the “one big thing” that will secure Georgia’s place in the west, recently adding an offer to NATO and the U.S. to provide a logistics hub for Afghanistan to his substantial troop commitment over the next two years. Our challenge is to convince President Saakashvili that he risks losing the enormous goodwill generated by Georgia’s extraordinary contributions in Afghanistan if he fails to combine them with a new push to deepen Georgia’s democratic development. Your visit gives us a chance to thank Georgia publicly for its contribution, providing reassurance of our support, and thereby creating space for Saakashvili to feel secure enough to do the right thing. End Summary.

3. (C) The upcoming deployment to Afghanistan is arguably the most visible example of President Saakashvili’s continued determination to anchor Georgia firmly in the west. The two-year deployment commitment follows an extant deployment of a reinforced light infantry company (173 troops) under French command and anticipates a likely additional partnership with the UK. The Georgians did well in their mission-readiness exercise last month; U.S. evaluators determined that the Georgian troops are sufficiently trained “to conduct the full spectrum of combat operations in a counter-insurgency environment” with their parent Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The battalion is continuing its training program (which you will observe) for an expected deployment in April.

4. (C) Despite the substantial commitment Georgia has made to Q4. (C) Despite the substantial commitment Georgia has made to the effort in Afghanistan, public discussion of Georgia’s involvement has been limited. President Saakashvili has made the case that the commitment is directly linked to Georgia’s own security, arguing publicly that “as soon as the Afghan situation is resolved and the war is over in Iraq, Georgia will be more protected.” He has also pointed out that serving in Afghanistan will give Georgian soldiers useful combat experience. Officials have avoided suggesting that the contribution will help Georgia get into NATO, saying instead that it will help Georgia demonstrate itself as a contributing partner, with the apparent implication that NATO allies will then take Georgia more seriously. Foreign Minister Vashadze, for example, described Georgia’s efforts as “our contribution to the tasks the alliance is trying to resolve in Afghanistan . . . the fight against terrorism, the fight against drug trafficking.” Opposition members have been mostly silent on the topic and offered little public criticism of the contribution, either on its own terms or as a strategy for moving toward NATO membership, although parliamentary opposition leader Giorgi Targamadze expressed support for the deployment to Deputy Secretary Steinberg during his February 5 visit to Tbilisi. Another opposition TBILISI 00000203 002 OF 004 leader, Irakli Alasania, even used language similar to the government’s when he said, “We should not be only consumers of security, but we also should be contributors to international security.” Overall, your visit provides an opportunity not only to raise the profile of Georgia’s involvement, but to frame the discussion in a helpful context.

5. (C) The training program — the Georgian Deployment Program-ISAF (GDP-ISAF) — has been in progress since September 1, 2009. Training includes broad hands-on training, from marksmanship to identifying and safely disposing of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). This hands-on training is supplemented by classroom seminars, ranging from cultural familiarization to medical officer training. Rather than remaining in a static position like in their current mission with the French, these Georgian troops will share “battlespace” with the U.S. Marines and be responsible for conducting the same combat mission as the U.S. Marines, without national caveats to the rules of engagement. The Georgians will also send two Georgian staff officers to ISAF under Turkish command, providing liaison to the Afghan MOD and National Defense Staff for one year.

6. (C) Whether they make the connection explicit or not, the Georgians see their contributions to Afghanistan as a down payment on their admission into NATO. Support for NATO remains high in Georgia. After the Alliance’s declaration at Bucharest in April 2008 that Georgia would eventually be a member and after the war in August, NATO has been intensifying relations with Georgia under the aegis of the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC). Through the NGC, Georgia and the Alliance have worked closely on an Annual National Program (ANP), which is designed to help Georgia advance reforms in areas key for membership, including political, economic, and defense reforms. Georgia continues to be a strong supporter of NATO operations and is a contributor to international security missions, including in particular ISAF in Afghanistan. The challenge is to express our appreciation for those efforts, but deliver the candid message that such contributions are a helpful, but insufficient step toward membership without the concomitant progress on the civilian side.

7. (C) It is hard to overestimate the extent to which an intense climate of insecurity permeates Georgian society and political culture. Russian forces, located as close as 25 miles outside of Tbilisi, are building permanent bases and Georgians hear a steady drip of Russian statements alleging Georgian aggression or announcing the latest step in incorporating Abkhazia into Russia’s economy. Moscow’s statements suggesting that Georgia is planning provocations in the North Caucasus have raised fears among Georgian officials that Russia is looking for another pretext. Tbilisi, in turn, is overly focused on weapons acquisition as an antidote to its jitters. It fears our approach to defense cooperation (heavily focused on developing the structures and processes to assess threats, develop appropriate responses and make informed decisions about use of force before moving to acquisition) is a trade-off to secure Russian cooperation on other issues, such as Iran. Your discussion of our Qon other issues, such as Iran. Your discussion of our broader efforts with Moscow will help reinforce with Saakashvili that we do not see this as a zero-sum equation – and that Georgia also benefits from Moscow’s cooperation on the wider agenda.

8. (C) The immediate security environment has stabilized, with fewer incidents along the administrative boundaries. Shootings and explosions still occur, but much less frequently; in the age-old tradition of the Caucasus, detentions have become the major source of tension, especially around South Ossetia. The Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) established by the Geneva talks have helped increase communication and decrease the volatility of individual incidents, especially in Abkhazia; the South Ossetian de facto authorities have refused to participate in their IPRM since October 2009, pending the resolution of three missing persons cases. Overall the Abkhaz de facto authorities are more interested in engaging with partners other than Russia and are therefore more constructive in the IPRM and in Geneva; they continue to allow international partners to operate inside Abkhazia. The South Ossetians are steadfastly uncooperative, even when TBILISI 00000203 003 OF 004 proposals would benefit their own residents. Local residents still face limitations on movements and other human rights concerns in both regions.

9. (C) A maturing Georgian policy on the territories reflects growing recognition that there is no short-term – or military – path to reintegrate them into Georgia, but implementation may founder on Abkhaz or Russian insistence on first discussing the status of the two regions as a way to gain international acceptance of Russia’s recognition of both. A key question is the extent to which the de factos control their own fate versus Russia orchestrating the immediate security ups and downs; the Georgians are convinced the Abkhaz/South Ossetian good cop-bad cop routine is played at the behest of the Russians. No one expects much constructive reaction to the strategy from South Ossetia, but a positive response from Abkhazia, even on relatively modest activities, could indicate sincere interest in moving away from Moscow’s orbit and finding some accommodation with Tbilisi. We are currently developing ways the United States will support the strategy’s objectives through our own activities.

10. (SBU) Even in Abkhazia, however, the underlying situation remains fundamentally unstable. Georgia and Russia disagree profoundly over the source of the instability and the direction the parties must take toward resolution of the conflict. This impasse has become more and more apparent in Geneva, where Georgia sees Russia as a party to the conflict and an existential threat, while Russia sees itself as a keeper of the peace analogous to the EUMM. The Geneva co-chairs have tried to square this circle by combining Russia’s demand for a non-use of force agreement (between Georgia and the regions) with Georgia’s demand for new international security arrangements, but Russia refuses to contemplate any new international presence. Even the Georgians agree that the talks provide a useful forum for engagement among the parties, but if we continue to see no progress on what should be simple issues, we will have to reconsider the usefulness of Geneva.

11. (SBU) The Saakashvili-led United National Movement (UNM) continues to hold a constitutional majority in Parliament, and its current poll numbers reflect broad popular support. The government’s restrained handling of the months-long opposition protests in 2009 reinforced Saakashvili’s and his party’s popularity throughout the country and reduced support for opposition leaders. A rapidly shrinking economy, Saakashvili’s sharpest challenge in 2009, seems to have stabilized beginning in late 2009. Although consumer indicators are improving, the economy remains a concern, as unemployment is up and investments and government revenues have fallen. International assistance, particularly the U.S. provision of USD one billion in aid following the August 2008 conflict, helped insulate Georgia from the worst of the global financial crisis and has provided a significant base for recovery. The EU, other donors and international financial institutions are providing an additional USD 3.5 billion in post-conflict assistance to Georgia.

12. (SBU) The government has made some tangible democratic progress in a number of areas, including passing a new Qprogress in a number of areas, including passing a new electoral code on December 28, 2009, which will set rules for upcoming May 2010 municipal elections. The divergent positions and motives of the opposition (which ranges from “responsible” parties who sit in parliament to “irreconcilable” ones who insist on Saakashvili’s early departure or removal before engaging in any dialogue) precluded the kind of grand bargain which could have turned the electoral code into an engine for new democratic reforms. In the current zero-sum environment, the government did not stretch itself, either. The revised election code has been sent to the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission for legal comment on whether it meets international standards; the Georgians expect to receive a response by March. President Saakashvili agreed to allow for the direct election of the Tbilisi mayor, giving the opposition a chance to control this politically important post in Georgia’s most opposition-minded city. However, substantial government influence, if not outright control, over broadcast and other media steepen the slope the opposition needs to climb. In addition, the government has formed a constitutional commission to review ideas for constitutional change to TBILISI 00000203 004 OF 004 lessen the power of the president.

13. (SBU) Opposition leaders, representing parties both inside and outside of Parliament, generally urge the United States and international community to do more to level the electoral playing field in Georgia by emphasizing the importance of U.S. support to strengthen civil society, improve the media climate, and foster increased political pluralism. Much of the public is still looking for the government to make good on its promises of a new wave of democratic reform as articulated by Saakashvili after the August 2008 conflict. The opposition argues that Saakashvili has consolidated power over the past seven years and is increasingly moving in an authoritarian direction. However, there is little agreement among opposition forces as to what needs to be done or what a good alternative political program would be.

14. (SBU) Georgian media at present reflect the polarized political environment in the country, largely divided into pro-government and pro-opposition operations. Nationwide television channels remain the main source of information for most people. Television content is limited, resulting in a majority of the population which is poorly informed about a variety of issues and everyday concerns. Limited news programming by the Georgian Public Broadcaster in Azeri, Armenian and Russian leaves members of ethnic minorities poorly informed about developments in Georgia; many receive news via satellite from Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. There are no hard walls separating the editorial and management sides of media organizations. The media market is small, creating financial challenges. Journalists are low-paid and tend to practice self-censorship.

15. (SBU) While official relations between Russia and Georgia remain contentious, the two governments reached a preliminary agreement in December to reopen a border crossing for transit traffic to Armenia and limited access for Georgians, and the government has indicated that it could be willing to sign a protocol as early as March. Georgian Airways ran a few charter flights to Moscow and St. Petersburg in January — the first direct commercial flights since a brief period in 2008 — and is negotiating for permission for more regular flights.

16. (C) Georgia is also concerned by a significant increase in military supplies from Russia to Armenia planned for 2010 primarily via overflights between Russia and Armenia. Although Georgia has continued to allow the flights to maintain a good relationship with Armenia, it does not believe Armenia has the capacity to use these shipments itself and fears that such armaments as large-caliber ammunition for aircraft could be intended for Russian forces in Armenia, instead of the Armenian military. Not only could such shipments disrupt the balance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but they could potentially be used to squeeze Georgia from the south as well should there be a future conflict with Russia.

17. (S) Georgia is also trying to manage its relationship with Iran. Georgia agrees with many of our concerns about Iran’s policies, and has been willing to raise those concerns directly with the Iranians. Georgia still faces lingering Qdirectly with the Iranians. Georgia still faces lingering anger from Tehran for extraditing an Iranian arms smuggler to the United States several years ago. At the same time, it cannot afford to alienate a powerful regional neighbor and major commercial partner — especially as it seeks to prevent any further recognitions of the breakaway regions.

BASS

WikiLeaks: EU diplomats calling US to press Georgia to work with Abkhaz

Excerpts

Thursday, 09 July 2009, 16:15

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STOCKHOLM 000418

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 07/09/2029

TAGS EUN, PREL, PGOV, IR, RS, SW

SUBJECT: EUR A/S GORDON’S JULY 3 MEETINGS WITH THE EU

POLITICAL DIRECTORS

STOCKHOLM 00000418 001.2 OF 006

Classified By: CDA LAURA J. KIRKCONNELL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

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SUMMARY

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¶1. (U) Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Phil Gordon met with the 27 EU Member State Political Directors in Stockholm July 3. He then met with the EU Political Directors “troika,” comprising Swedish PolDir Bjorn Lyrvall, EU Council Secretariat DG Robert Cooper, EU External Relations Commission PolDir Karel Kovanda, Spanish PolDir Alfonso Lucini, and EU Council Secretariat Policy Coordinator Helga Schmid.

¶2. (C) On Iran, A/S Gordon emphasized that post-election developments have not altered the Obama Administration’s fundamental approach to the nuclear question, and UK PolDir Mark Lyall-Grant urged the EU to be in position “to move rapidly” with new sanctions at the beginning of the Spanish EU Presidency in January 2010. On the Middle East peace process, the United States was focused on creating the conditions necessary for peace before proposing full-scale negotiations. This would require a stop to Israeli settlements and efforts to build up Palestinian security capacity and an end to violence and incitement. French PolDir Gerard Araud raised the possibility of an EU security force in support of a possible agreement. Regarding the U.S.-Russia relationship, Gordon said that the Russians are testing the Obama Administration to see if it will compromise on its principles; it won,t.

RUSSIA

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¶13. (C) At Lyrvall’s request, A/S Gordon offered some impressions to the group on U.S. relations with Russia. He said that we are looking to restore relations while also stressing our core principles; e.g., no spheres of influence, democracies have the right to choose alliances, and non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russians, for their part, are exploring U.S. willingness to compromise in the name of better relations, which we will not do. A/S Gordon said that with regard to the Medvedev proposals, the U.S. is not prepared to compromise on European security. Lyrvall asked about expectations for the Moscow Summit. A/S Gordon said we were not trying to overstate expectations, but we are talking seriously with the Russians on arms control and Afghanistan. Lithuanian PolDir Eitvydas Bajarunas urged a common U.S.-EU approach on Belarus and Georgia, and A/S Gordon replied that we can only interpret the Zeltser release as an expression of Belarus’s interest in better relations, and that he was planning to go to Belarus himself. He said Georgia was a good example of the U.S. not compromising its principles in the name of better relations with Moscow– in fact, Russia had been isolated on decisions regarding OSCE and UNOMIG ) and he noted the Vice President’s upcoming trip to Georgia and Ukraine.

RUSSIA

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¶15. (C) A/S Gordon conveyed that the U.S. may be making some progress with Russia on START follow-on negotiations, and may also be making progress with regard to cooperation on Afghanistan. We have little to no progress to report regarding Georgia. The Russians are testing the Obama Administration to see if it will compromise; it will not. Lyrvall commented that there have been no breakthroughs in EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiations, and noted that the Russians see the EU’s

STOCKHOLM 00000418 004.2 OF 006

Eastern Partnership initiative through a zero-sum lens; if it encourages closer EU ties with six former-Soviet states, it must be anti-Russia. Lucini recommended engaging Russia in the Eastern Partnership through cooperation on concrete projects. Helga Schmid praised the OSCE Ministerial in Corfu for its emphasis on the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security.

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GEORGIA

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¶16. (C) Schmid commented that the Geneva process is useful because it is the only venue which includes all parties to the Georgia conflict. She encouraged the U.S. to press Georgia to work with the Abkhaz; the Abkhaz have been rebuffed in their overtures to the Georgians, and are left with no option but to seek Russia’s support. Kovanda similarly urged outreach to the Abkhaz; they are looking for some daylight with the Russians, and we should help. EU negotiations on visa facilitation with Georgia are not going well. Lucini said we need to let Georgians know we support them without giving Saakashvili “a blank check.”

¶17. (C) A/S Gordon said the Georgians have shown reasonable restraint with protesters lately, marking a departure from previous behavior. Vice President Biden’s upcoming trip to Georgia will emphasize the need to strengthen democratic institutions. A/S Gordon inquired about potential U.S. participation in the EU’s Georgia monitoring mission. An American contribution*either official USG or via NGOs–would showcase our commitment, and could potentially deter future Russian misbehavior. Schmid noted that U.S. participation would also mean opening the mission to Turkey and Ukraine; U.S. political support might be preferable. Cooper agreed that it would be hard for the EU to resist Turkish participation in the EU monitoring mission if the U.S. participated, as Turkey is an EU candidate country. Turkish participation would not necessarily be a bad thing, but it would “need some thinking about.”

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/07/09STOCKHOLM418.html